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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a limited partnership, 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
and Cross-Appellant, 
vs. 
ROLLINS, BROWN & GUNNELL, INC., 
Defendant/Appellant 
and Cross-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a judgment on a jury 
verdict. The Utah Supreme Court originally had jurisdiction of 
this appeal, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i)(1987), 
but transferred the case to the Court of Appeals, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1987). The Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1987). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Plaintiff accepts the statement of the issues presented by 
defendant's appeal. The following issues are presented by 
plaintiff's cross-appeal: 
Case No. 870550-CA 
Category 14b 
1. Is plaintiff entitled to an award of prejudgment 
interest on the damages assessed by the jury? 
2. Did the district court err in failing to award plain-
tiff its costs incurred for trial transcripts used in the pre-
vious appeal of this matter, where plaintiff was the successful 
party in the appeal? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Plaintiff believes the following statutes and rules are 
determinative of certain issues raised by its cross-appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1 (1953) (prior to amendment in 1981): 
The legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance 
of any money, goods, or things in action shall be six 
percent per annum. But nothing herein contained shall 
be construed as to in any way affect any penalty or 
interest charge which by law applies to delinquent or 
other taxes or to any contract or obligations made 
before the 14th day of May, 1907. 
R. Utah S. Ct. 34(a): 
Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is 
dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant 
unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by 
the Court; if a judgment or order is affirmed, costs 
shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise 
ordered; if a judgment or order is reversed, costs 
shall be taxed against the respondent unless otherwise 
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed 
in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed as 
ordered by the Court. Costs shall not be allowed or 
taxed in a criminal case. 
R. Utah S. Ct. 34(c): 
The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the 
prevailing party in the appeal: . . . actual costs 
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incurred in the preparation and transmission of the 
record including costs of the reporter's transcript 
unless otherwise ordered by the Court; . . , 
Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d): 
Except when express provision therefor is made either 
in a statute of this state or in these Rules, costs 
shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party 
unless the court otherwise directs; provided, however, 
where an appeal or other proceedings for review is 
taken, costs of the action, other than costs in con-
nection with such appeal or other proceeding for 
review, shall abide the final determination of the 
cause. Costs against the State of Utah, its officers 
and agencies, shall be imposed only to the extent 
permitted by law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff accepts defendant's statement of the case as to 
the issues presented by defendant's appeal. The statement of 
the case is supplemented as follows, regarding the issues 
raised by the cross-appeal. 
This action was originally filed on or about September 9, 
1974. (R. 1-5.) The acts of negligence upon which the 
plaintiff's claim was based occurred in 1973 and 1974. 
Plaintiff requested that the judgment include prejudgment 
interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of filing of 
the Complaint to the date of the jury's verdict, which totals 
$15,519.65. (R. 703-08.) The District Court denied the request 
for prejudgment interest. (R. 763-4.) 
This case was initially tried to a jury on November 17 
through 19, 1980, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff 
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and assessed damages at $30,000.00. (R. 252.) Thereafter, 
District Judge Maurice Harding granted defendant's motion for a 
new trial. (R. 306, 349-50.) On the day scheduled for the new 
trial, District Judge David Sam ruled that John Price Asso-
ciates, Inc., was a necessary and indispensable party to the 
action. Plaintiff elected not to amend its Complaint and the 
action was dismissed. (R. 373-5.) Plaintiff appealed to the 
Utah Supreme Court, which reversed the District Court's ruling. 
Price-Orem Investment Company v. Rollins, Brown and Gunnel1, 
Inc., 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986) (see Appendix B). 
After the most recent trial, plaintiff filed its Memorandum 
of Costs and Disbursements, a copy of which is attached hereto 
as Appendix A. (R. 673-5.) The plaintiff requested as costs, 
and the trial court originally awarded, the expenses of the 
transcripts for the November, 1980 trial, which were part of 
the record on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. (R. 673-5, 
765-8.) On September 11, 1987, defendant filed an Amended 
Motion to Tax Costs, complaining that plaintiff was not enti-
tled to recover the costs of trial transcripts. (R. 775.) On 
September 17, 1987, the trial court amended the judgment to 
reduce costs to $297.30, stating in its ruling that the costs 
of the trial transcripts were not proper costs. (R. 777.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The jury found that plaintiff was damaged, in that plaintiff 
was unable, due to defendant's negligence, to construct improve-
ments on its property as planned. The jury determined that the 
plaintiff's planned shop space could have been constructed and 
that sufficient parking space was available on the property. 
The jury's award of damages was based upon competent apprai-
sal testimony. In formulating and rendering an opinion of the 
diminution in value of the real estate, plaintiff's expert need 
not have considered the rental history of the property after 
the date of appraisal and injury. Special damages awarded by 
the jury were specifically established by the evidence. 
Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest on the jury's 
award, from the date of filing the Complaint to the date of the 
jury's verdict. Plaintiff's loss, the diminution in value of 
the real estate, was fixed in 1974. An award of prejudgment 
interest is appropriate even though the amount of the loss may 
be subject to dispute and expert opinion. 
The trial court should have awarded plaintiff the sums paid 
for transcripts of the first trial of this matter. The tran-
scripts were part of the record in the prior appeal and, pur-
suant to applicable rules, are taxable costs. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY DECIDED, ON COMPETENT EVIDENCE, 
THAT PLAINTIFF COULD HAVE BUILT THE SHOP 
SPACE AS CONTEMPLATED. 
The defendant argues on appeal that it presented "uncontro-
verted evidence that plaintiff suffered no damage," since the 
shopping center purportedly could not be built as planned 
because it would violate Orem City parking ordinances. Defen-
dant's assertion that the evidence was uncontroverted is 
inaccurate. Evidence on the sufficiency of the parking was 
presented by both sides, and the issue was resolved by the jury 
in favor of plaintiff. In addition, inasmuch as the defense 
was one of illegality, defendant bore the burden of proof on 
the issue. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c). In addition, the evidence is 
viewed, on appeal, in the light most favorable to the verdict, 
and the verdict should not be overturned unless the evidence, 
viewed in that light, is insufficient to support it. Von Hake 
v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). 
The evidence regarding the ability of the plaintiff to con-
struct the anticipated shop space, due to parking restrictions, 
was sharply conflicting. Randall Deschamps, the Orem City 
Planner from 1973 through 1978, testified that the site plan 
had been approved by Orem City, including the planned shop 
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space that was caused to be deleted by reason of the defen-
dant 's negligence. (R. 1631, 1700; Tr. 447, 516.) See Trial 
Exhibit No. 17. (R. 788.) In fact, Mr. Deschamps recommended 
that the Orem City Planning Commission approve the site plan. 
(R. 1686, Tr. 502.) Based upon the approval, Price-Orem 
Investment could have built the shopping center as planned. 
(R. 1700-01; Tr. 516-7.) 
Although Mr. Deschamps testified that it was his current 
opinion there was insufficient parking for the original develop-
ment, he confirmed at trial that the number of parking spaces 
required was dependent upon the uses to which the buildings 
were put. (R. 1687-9, 1700, 1712-4; Tr. 503-05, 516, 528-30.) 
For example, a retail store requires more parking than does a 
bank or professional office of the same size. See Trial 
Exhibit No. 22. Mr. Deschamps had no explanation as to why the 
original site plan was approved, thus casting substantial doubt 
on his opinion. (R. 1701, Tr. 517.) 
Using the Orem City ordinance defendant argued was appli-
cable, and assuming that the lost shop space would have been 
used as retail space, the additional 2,100 square feet would 
have necessitated 11.55 parking stalls (5.5 parking spaces per 
1,000 square feet, without taking into account permissible 
deductions for furnace rooms and other unusable space). Trial 
Exhibit No. 22. Although Mr. Deschamps concluded that there 
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were only 490 parking stalls on the property in 1980, he ex-
pressly disclaimed the notion that no more could have been 
built. (R. 1663-4; Tr. 479-80.) Possible alternatives acknow-
ledged by Mr. Deschamps for increasing the parking were rede-
signing the parking configuration, building a parking ramp, or 
simply painting more stalls. (R. 1664-5; Tr. 480-1.) 
The testimony of both Randall Deschamps and Russell Brown, 
a principal of the defendant, was based upon investigation and 
observations made in November of 1980, the date of the first 
trial in this matter. (R. 1636-7, 1641-2, 1663, 1780; Tr. 
452-3, 457-8, 479, 596.) Both witnesses testified as to the 
number of parking spaces on the property in November of 1980, 
which is not at all relevant, and based their opinions that 
there was insufficient parking upon the uses to which the 
buildings were being put in November of 1980. (R. 1637-44, 
1780; Tr. 453-60, 596.) 
Defendant does not complain on appeal that the jury was 
improperly instructed in resolving these issues. The jury had 
ample evidence to support the conclusion it reached; therefore, 
its resolution of the factual issue should not be disturbed by 
this court on appeal. The jury determined that there was suffi-
cient parking for the original development and that Orem City 
had approved the original site plan, including all of the shop 
space planned by plaintiff. 
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POINT II 
THE JURY'S AWARD OF DAMAGES WAS SUPPORTED BY 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Defendant argues that plaintiff's evidence on damages was 
"speculative" and "mere conjecture." Defendant's main com-
plaint is that plaintiff's expert appraiser should have been 
required to use the known rental history of the property (for 
the period from 1974 through 1987) in arriving at his conclu-
sions regarding the fair market value of the property before 
and after plaintiff's loss (in 1974). Because the defendant's 
argument is fundamentally flawed, defendant failed to proffer 
or introduce any evidence regarding the actual rental history of 
the property, and plaintiff's damages were otherwise supported 
by competent evidence, the jury's verdict should be sustained. 
Defendant's argument that the property's rental history up 
to the date of trial is relevant to the fair market value of 
the property immediately after the injury, is fundamentally 
flawed. The fair market value of commercial real estate at any 
given point in time is usually dependent upon projections of 
the future. That does not make the evidence of value as of 
that date speculative (as is conceded by defendant on appeal). 
Defendant argues, however, that because of the time that 
transpired between the date of injury and the second trial 
(thirteen years), the fair market value of the property in 1974 
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is somehow dependent upon the rental history of the property 
for the intervening period. 
As the Utah Supreme Court recently noted in Thorsen v. 
Johnson, 745 P.2d 1243, 1244-5 (Utah 1987), "Although there are 
exceptions and variations, generally the measure of damages for 
injury to real property is the difference between the value of 
the property immediately before and immediately after the injury 
(often referred to as the "Diminution in Value" rule)." (foot-
note omitted). See also Ault v. Dubois, 739 P.2d 1117 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1987). Other measures of damages considered by the 
jury were lost rental income and the costs of repair. The jury 
was properly instructed that it was to assess damages in the 
lesser of loss rental income (minus costs of producing the 
rental income), diminution in value, or costs of repair (if 
reasonable to do so), together with such special damages as 
architectural fees and landscaping costs. See Instruction No. 
24. (R. 638.) 
Ralph Wright, plaintiff's appraiser, gave his opinion as to 
the diminution in fair market value. See Trial Exhibit No. 
12. His opinion was reached, in part, using the income capital-
ization method. (R. 1511-14; Tr. 328-31.) Capitalizing the 
expected income from the property, Mr. Wright arrived at a fair 
market value of the shopping center had it been completed as 
planned and a fair market value of the property without the shop 
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space lost because of defendant's negligence. (R. 1514-5; Tr. 
331-2.) The difference between the two values was $72,351.00. 
Since construction costs saved were approximately $42,000.00, 
there was a net loss to plaintiff of $30,351.00. (R. 1515-6; 
Tr. 332-3.) In other words, if the defendant had not been 
negligent and the shopping center had been constructed as 
planned, its value, in 1974, would have been $72,351 greater 
than it actually was (less savings on construction costs of 
$42,000). 
Mr. Wright arrived at a slightly higher difference in fair 
market values, using an annuity approach. (R. 1510-1; 
Tr. 327-8.) Under the annuity approach, which gives, in 
essence, the present value of lost net rentals, Mr. Wright 
determined the loss was $80,598.00, prior to deducting for 
construction costs saved. (R. 1511; Tr. 328.) Based upon the 
two approaches, Mr. Wright concluded the diminution in value 
was $75,000. (R. 1514; Tr. 331.) It is clear, however, that 
the jury's verdict was based upon the lower figure derived from 
the income capitalization approach. 
The income capitalization approach is a recognized appraisal 
technique. It is particularly useful when dealing with rental 
or income properties or where comparables are unavailable. 
Since in this instance the subject was a small shop within a 
shopping center, other sales would unlikely have been compar-
able. (R. 1535; Tr. 351.) 
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Mr. Wright, and defendant's expert appraiser, Judd 
Harward,1 agreed that fair market value means, generally 
speaking, the price that would be agreed upon between a willing 
buyer and willing seller, neither acting under special or extra-
ordinary circumstances. (R. 1550, 1584; Tr. 366, 400.) Ob-
viously, neither the willing buyer nor the willing seller as of 
1974 would have had knowledge of the future that would be exper-
ienced by the shopping center, and Mr. Harward so conceded. 
(R. 1585; Tr. 401.) Instead, both the willing buyer and willing 
seller would rely upon their best judgment as to what the future 
would be. Mr. Wright and John Price both testified as to the 
standards commonly used in the industry for vacancy rates and 
management costs. (R. 1226-9, 1504; Tr. 43-6, 321.) 
Mr. Wright used those figures in calculating the value of the 
rents lost and the value of the property. Trial Exhibit No. 12. 
The issue in this case is not what the value of the property 
was in 1987, at the time of the second trial, but what the 
value was immediately after the loss occurred and it became 
apparent that the shop space could not be built. Events occur-
ring after an injury are irrelevant in determining the amount 
of damages. National Steel Corp. v. Great Lakes Towing, 574 
*Mr. Harward did not testify as to the diminution in value of 
the property, or on any other measure of damages. Instead, Mr. 
Harward testified only as to proper appraisal techniques and 
ethics. 
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F.2d 339 (6th Cir. 1978). If defendant's argument was accep-
ted, the amount of damages plaintiff would be entitled to 
receive would change from time to time, and could go up or down 
depending upon innumerable factors. Because those factors are 
irrelevant to a determination of plaintiff's loss, defendant's 
argument is without merit. 
Defendant also assumes, without citing any evidence of the 
fact, that the rental experience projected by Mr. Wright was 
different than what actually occurred. Assuming arguendo that 
Mr. Wright should have based his opinion of diminution in value 
on the subsequent rental history, absent such evidence, or at 
least a proffer of what the evidence would have been, the jury 
was entitled to rely upon Mr. Wright's projections as accurate. 
The jury also awarded damages for certain additional ex-
penses incurred because of defendant's negligence. Each of the 
items of special damages was supported by competent testimony. 
John Price testified that he paid $3,000 in additional archi-
tectural fees to redesign the shopping center to take into 
account the incorrect location of the Skaggs building. 
(R. 1293; Tr. 109.) Mr. Price also testified that additional 
curb and gutter work in the area cost him $3.50 per lineal 
foot. (R. 1307; Tr. 123.) Max Smith, the architect, testified 
that there were sixty additional lineal feet of curb and gutter 
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because of the revisions (R. 1384-5; Tr. 200-01.), or an addi-
tional $210 in costs. Finally, Mr. Price testified that it 
cost approximately $300 for additional piping in the area re-
quired because of the redesign of the shopping center. 
(R. 1307; Tr. 123.) Each of these items is established by 
direct evidence. 
Two juries have now been presented with essentially the 
same evidence, and each concluded that plaintiff suffered 
damages of approximately $30,000. The damages awarded by the 
most recent jury are, as set forth above, expressly founded in 
the evidence and the law. 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST. 
Plaintiff was entitled to an award of prejudgment interest 
on its loss, from the date of filing the Complaint to the date 
of the jury's verdict. Plaintiff relies upon Utah Code Ann. 
§ 15-1-1 (1953) for an award of prejudgment interest. The 
version of the statute in effect at the time of filing of this 
action stated: 
The legal rate of interest for the loan or forbearance 
of any money, goods, or things in action shall be six 
percent per annum. But nothing herein contained shall 
be construed as to in any way affect any penalty or 
interest charge which by law applies to delinquent or 
other taxes or to any contract or obligations made 
before the 14th day of May, 1907. 
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The Utah Supreme Court held, in SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & 
Faber, 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986), that interest on a claim for 
breach of a lease occurring prior to March 14, 1981, was 
limited to the six percent rate in effect prior to a 1981 
amendment raising the interest rate to 10 percent. It appears, 
therefore, that the applicable statute provides for a prejudg-
ment interest rate of 6% per annum on choses in action. 
The Utah Supreme Court has imposed two requirements prior 
to allowing an award of prejudgment interest. First, the 
damages must be complete and the amount of the loss fixed as of 
a particular date. Secondly, the loss must be measured by 
facts and figures. See Bjork v. April Industries, Inc., 560 
P.2d 315 (Utah 1977), cert, denied., 431 U.S. 930 (1977). 
The general trend of the law, and Utah law in particular, 
has been toward an award of prejudgment interest in recognition 
of modern commercial life. The Utah Supreme Court noted, in 
Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 88 P. 1003, 1005-6 (Utah 1907), 
that: 
[T]he allowance of interest in cases of torts to 
property is in harmony with the trend of modern 
authority. It is quite true that there are cases 
against this rule, but they are not, as we conceive, 
based on either good reason or good logic. . . . If a 
person's property is destroyed or damaged, why is he 
not entitled to be compensated to the full extent of 
its value in money so that he may replace the same 
with other property of a like nature? If on the day 
of its injury or destruction he restores or replaces 
it with his own money, why is he not entitled to 
interest on that money to the date of repayment? 
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. . . By being awarded legal interest, therefore, he 
is simply placed in status quo, and nothing short of 
this is full compensation, and that is just what the 
law aims to accomplish. 
The Court distinguished and explained why prejudgment interest 
should not be awarded in certain cases: 
In the class of cases, therefore, where the damage is 
complete and the amount of the loss is fixed as of a 
particular time, there is—there can be—no reason why 
interest should be withheld merely because the damages 
are unliquidated. There are certain cases of unliqui-
dated damages where interest cannot be allowed. In 
all personal injury cases, cases of death by wrongful 
act, libel, slander, false imprisonment, malicious 
prosecution, assault and battery, and all cases where 
the damages are incomplete and are peculiarly within 
the province of the jury to assess at the time of 
trial, no interest is permissible. But this is so 
because the damages are continuing and may even reach 
beyond the time of trial. 
Id. at 1006. The Court therefore rejected the appellant's argu-
ment that interest could not be awarded on "unliquidated damages 
sounding in tort." Id. at 1004. See also Uinta Pipeline Corp. 
v. White Superior Co., 546 P.2d 885 (Utah 1976). 
In this case, additional architectural fees, curb and 
gutter, and piping expenses, were, without question, capable of 
being measured by facts and figures. The main element of 
damages, the diminution in value of the property, is likewise 
the sort of damages upon which prejudgment interest should be 
allowed. Diminution in value of real estate does not involve 
an issue "peculiarly within the province of the jury", as does 
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a personal injury matter. As is demonstrated by plaintiff's 
appraisal testimony, the decrease in value of the real estate 
is not a subjective question, even though it may be subject to 
dispute between the parties. 
In Anderson v. State Farm and Casualty Co., 583 P.2d 101 
(Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court held that prejudgment 
interest should be awarded under facts similar to those in this 
case. In Anderson, plaintiff sued the defendant insurance 
company for a loss resulting from a theft of personal property. 
The issue of the value of the property was apparently not 
resolved by the trial court, since the trial court found that 
the plaintiff has failed to meet certain deadlines in the insur-
ance policy for filing suit. Nevertheless, on appeal, the 
Supreme Court noted that prejudgment interest should be awarded 
in such a case, stating that the loss was fixed as of a parti-
cular time and the amount could be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy. 
In this case, where the diminution in value is based upon 
expert opinion and specific facts, it is appropriate to award 
interest. Absent an award of interest, the plaintiff is by no 
stretch of the imagination made whole for defendant's negli-
gence. Denial of an award of prejudgment interest would simply 
promote pretrial delays in cases such as this. 
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POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER COSTS OF 
TRANSCRIPTS USED IN THE PRIOR APPEAL. 
As evidenced by plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and Dis-
bursements, plaintiff spent $614.90 for trial transcripts of 
the November 1980 trial. See Appendix A. These transcripts 
were used in the appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, which was 
resolved in favor of plaintiff on January 9, 1986. In that 
appeal, the court reversed the order dismissing plaintiff's 
complaint and remanded for further proceedings. (A copy of the 
Supreme Court's opinion is attached as Appendix B.) 
Rule 34(a), Rules of Utah Supreme Court, states that "if a 
judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the 
respondent unless otherwise ordered. ..." Rule 34(c), Rules 
of Utah Supreme Court, states that among the costs to be taxed 
are the actual costs of preparing and transmitting the record, 
including reporter's transcripts. Finally, Utah R. Civ. P. 
54(d), states that costs should be allowed to the prevailing 
party unless the court otherwise directs. 
Plaintiff was the prevailing party in the previous appeal. 
The costs of the trial transcripts are a taxable cost pursuant 
to the Rules. Plaintiff was the prevailing party in the action. 
Costs, including the costs of the prior appeal, should be 
allowed. 
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CONCLUSION 
The judgment on jury verdict should be a form modified, 
however, to provide for an award for prejudgment interest in 
the sum of $15,519.65 and additional costs of $614.90. 
DATED this 9th day of June, 1988. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Bryce py Panzer 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/1 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent and Cross-Appellant were mailed 
to the following, postage prepaid, this 9th day of June, 1988 
Jackson Howard 
Leslie W. Slaugh 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
2& 
SCMBDP245 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Memorandum of Costs and Disbursements 
BRYCE D. PANZER (A2509) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT CO., 
a limited partnership, MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND DISBURSEMENTS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Civil No. 41071 
ROLLINS, BROWN & GUNNELL, 
INC., 
Defendant. 
COST 
Service of Summons and Complaint $ 18.00 
Filing fee for Complaint 25.00 
Deposition costs: 
Russell Brown (original) 44.00 
Robert Gunnell (original) 45.80 
David Thurgood (original) 44.00 
John Price (copy) 33.00 
Max Smith (copy) 34.50 
Trial Transcripts (Nov. 1980): 
Stanley Roundy 456.50 
Dale Johnson & Associates 158.40 
Witness Fee and Mileage (David Thurgood) . . . . 24.50 
Service of Subpoena (David Thurgood) 10.50 
TOTAL COSTS $894.20 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Bryce D. Panzer, being first sworn, says that he is the 
attorney for the prevailing party in the above-entitled action, 
is informed relative to the necessity for incurring the above 
listed costs and disbursements and states the memorandum is 
correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /#& day of 
June, 19 87. 
My Commission Expires: 
/-M9# 
-2-
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Sandra Westergard, being duly sworn, states that she is 
employed in the law offices of Snow, Christensen & Martineau, 
attorneys for Plaintiff 
and that she served the attached Memorandum of Costs and 
Disbursements 
Civil No. 41071 , upon the following parties by placing 
a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Jackson Howard 
Attorney for Defendants 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
by depositing the same in the United States Mail, first-class 
mail, postage prepaid, on the loth day of June # 1987. 
^ 3 ^ , * ^ ^ 
T 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO "before me on this iot_h day of 
June , 1987, 
My Commission Expires: 
ary Public 
siding at Salt Lake City, Utah 
APPENDIX "B" 
Price-Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, 
Inc., 713 P.2d 55 (Utah 1986). 
PRICE-OREM INV. v. ROLLINS, BROWN & GUNNELL Utah 55 
Cite as 713 PJ2d 55 (Utah 1986) 
receive, and shall be paid, such compen-
sation for loss sustained on account of 
such injury or death, and such amount 
for medical, nurse and hospital services 
and medicines, and, in case of death, 
such amount of funeral expenses, as 
herein provided. 
The foregoing section makes no provision 
for the recovery of medical expenses paid 
under mistake of fact. All of the remain-
ing sections of the worker's Compensation 
Law are also silent on the subject.14 
The issue presented has not previously 
been addressed by this Court. However, a 
number of other jurisdictions have resolved 
the issue in favor of the claimant. 
In the recent case of Matter ofJohner,xh 
the Supreme Court of Wyoming followed 
the earlier decisions of the courts of Kan-
sas,16 Washington,17 Maine,18 Michigan,19 
and Oregon.20 Those courts concluded that 
because worker's compensation statutes 
provide the exclusive remedy for work-re-
lated injuries, in the absence of a statutory 
provision for the recovery of funds paid to 
an employee because of a mistake of fact, 
it did not lie within the prerogative of the 
court to fashion any common law exception 
to the statutes. This is a sound premise 
which we adopt. 
Following well-recognized rules of statu-
tory construction, we construe the subject 
statute liberally and reasonably in favor of 
the payment of benefits and decline to read 
into the statute a provision not apparently 
intended by its enactment. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
The case is remanded for entry of an order 
consistent with this opinion. 
STEWART, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., 
and DEAN E. CONDER, District Judge, 
concur. 
14. U.C.A.. 1953, §§ 35-1-1 to -107. 
15. Wyo., 643 P.2d 932 (1982). 
16. Tompkins v. George Rinner Constr. Co., 196 
Kan. 244, 409 P.2d 1001 (1966). 
17. State v. Olson, 172 Wash. 424, 20 P.2d 850 
(1933). See also Deal v. Department of Labor & 
Indus., 78 Wash.2d 537, 477 P.2d 175 (1970). 
ZIMMERMAN, J., having disqualified 
himself, does not participate herein; CON-
DER, District Judge, sat. 
(o | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
PRICE-OREM INVESTMENT COMPA-
NY, a limited partnership, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
ROLLINS, BROWN AND GUNNELL, 
INC., Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 19096. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 9, 1986. 
Shopping center developer filed suit 
against surveyor alleging negligence in 
staking of building. Following jury verdict 
for developer, the Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, David Sam, J., granted mo-
tion for new trial and thereafter dismissal 
of suit and developer appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in granting new trial; (2) the surveyor was 
entitled to introduce evidence of develop-
er's failure to mitigate damages; and (3) 
the contractor who hired surveyor was not 
indispensable party. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded. 
Stewart, J., dissented. 
18. American Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Murray, Me., 420 
A.2d 251 (1980). 
19. Stewart v. Saginaw Osteopathic Hosp., 100 
Mich.App. 502, 298 N.W.2d 911 (1980). 
20. Williams v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 31 Or. 
App. 1301, 572 P.2d 658 (1977). 
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1. New Trial <3=>72(5) 
Trial court is not free to grant new 
trial merely because it disagrees with judg-
ment of jury; new trial may properly be 
granted only when jury's verdict is mani-
festly against weight of evidence. 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>1015(1) 
Decision of trial court to grant new 
trial will not be disturbed on appeal when 
record contains substantial competent evi-
dence which would support verdict in favor 
of moving party. 
3. New Trial 0=72(9) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion, 
in shopping center developer's action for 
surveyor's alleged negligence, in granting 
surveyor's motion for new trial where sub-
stantial evidence existed that would justify 
verdict in favor of surveyor, despite alleged 
concessions of liability in pleadings. 
4. Damages <s=>157(2) 
Surveyor, in action for its alleged neg-
ligence, was not precluded from introduc-
ing evidence of shopping center developer's 
failure to mitigate damages where develop-
er had adequate notice of the issue, though 
surveyor failed to plead it as affirmative 
defense. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 8(c). 
5. Fraud <s=50 
Elements of fraud need not be indepen-
dently established in action for negligent 
misrepresentation; qualifying Jardine v. 
Brunswick, 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659; 
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title 
Insurance Co., Utah, 666 P.2d 302. 
6. Fraud <s=>29 
Privity of contract is not necessary 
prerequisite to liability for negligent mis-
representation. 
7. Fraud <s=>29 
Owner and developer of land stated 
cause of action for negligent misrepresen-
tation on theory that it justifiably relied 
upon accuracy of allegedly negligent sur-
vey, though surveyor was hired by third-
party general contractor. 
8. Fraud <s=>39 
Third-party contractor who hired sur-
veyor was not indispensable party in devel-
oper's suit against surveyor for negligent 
misrepresentation where statute of limita-
tions [U.C.A.1953, 78-12-25] had already 
run on any claim by contractor against 
surveyor. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 19. 
George A. Hunt, Bryce D. Panzer, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Jackson Howard, Richard B. Johnson, 
Provo for defendant and respondent. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Plaintiff Price-Orem Investment Compa-
ny ("Price-Orem") appeals from the district 
court's order dismissing its suit on the 
ground that it failed to join an indispens-
able party. Price-Orem also asserts that 
the trial court erred in granting a new trial 
to defendant Rollins, Brown and Gunnell, 
Inc. ("Rollins, Brown"), after the jury re-
turned a verdict finding defendant liable 
for negligently surveying a building site in 
plaintiffs shopping center. We reverse 
the trial court's dismissal of the action and 
remand for trial. 
In July of 1973, John Price Associates, 
Inc. ("JPA"), a general contractor, con-
tracted with Rollins, Brown to survey a 
shopping center site owned and developed 
by Price-Orem. Rollins, Brown surveyed 
and staked the property and then certified 
that the survey represented the property's 
true boundaries. 
The following summer, JPA entered into 
another contract with Rollins, Brown, this 
time to stake out the Skaggs building, the 
first of several buildings to be constructed 
on the site. Rollins, Brown staked the 
building, referring to copies of the con-
struction and site plans rather than to the 
original survey it had conducted or to its 
survey field notes. As a starting point for 
staking the building, Rollins, Brown uti-
lized a property corner marked with both a 
one-inch diameter rebar post and a wooden 
stake labeled "N.W. Corner." Unfortu-
nately, this apparent property corner was 
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located thirty feet south of the actual cor-
ner, which caused a thirty-foot error in the 
staking of the building. The error was 
discovered one month later when Rollins, 
Brown was performing additional survey 
work on the site. 
Rollins, Brown, JPA, and Price-Orem met 
at the job site to discuss the problem on 
July 17, 1974. At that time, approximately 
two hundred and thirty-five cubic yards of 
concrete had been poured for the Skaggs 
building. Most of the interior footings 
were completed, and some plumbing and 
electrical work was in place. Price-Orem 
ultimately absorbed the error by limiting 
the shop space planned for the shopping 
center. It then filed suit against Rollins, 
Brown, alleging negligence in the staking 
of the building and seeking damages re-
sulting from the reduction in available foot-
age. 
At trial in July of 1980, Price-Orem con-
tended that Rollins, Brown had conceded 
liability. Its evidence, therefore, primarily 
addressed damages.1 It alleged that leas-
ing and financing restrictions required it to 
proceed with construction and absorb the 
thirty-foot error by limiting the planned 
shop space, rather than by redesigning the 
center to recoup the lost space or by relo-
cating the Skaggs building, either of which 
it estimated would have cost $100,000. 
Price-Orem's expert testified that its dam-
ages exceeded $80,000. 
Although Rollins, Brown conceded that a 
surveying error had been made, at trial it 
denied that the error constituted negli-
gence. It further asserted that Price-Orem 
had failed to mitigate its damages when it 
summarily dismissed Rollins, Brown's pro-
posed solution of relocating the Skaggs 
building, which it estimated would have 
cost only $3,000 at the early stages of 
construction. Rollins, Brown also claimed 
that the shopping center had been initially 
1. The lack of focus upon the liability issue by 
Price Orem was apparently because Rollins, 
Brown admitted in the pleadings that a staking 
error had been made and conceded liability in 
its trial memorandum. Rollins, Brown also 
submitted a jury instruction admitting liability. 
In their opening statements, both parties repre-
designed without sufficient parking space 
to meet zoning requirements and would 
have been unlawful if constructed as de-
signed; therefore, Price-Orem suffered no 
damages because the loss of the shop space 
brought the parking space into compliance 
with the zoning laws. Finally, Rollins, 
Brown argued that because its surveying 
contract was with JPA, Price-Orem was not 
in privity of contract with Rollins, Brown 
and, therefore, had no standing to sue. 
The jury found Rollins, Brown liable for 
negligently staking the building and award-
ed Price-Orem damages of $30,000. Rol-
lins, Brown then moved for a new trial. 
The judge granted the motion on the 
grounds that the damages were excessive 
and the evidence was insufficient to estab-
lish Rollins, Brown's negligence. 
Between that ruling and the date set for 
the new trial, Rollins, Brown was allowed 
to file an amended answer to Price-Orem's 
complaint. In the amended answer, Rol-
lins, Brown raised a new claim—that the 
general contractor, JPA, was an indispens-
able party. Price-Orem elected not to 
bring JPA into the action, the trial court 
ruled that JPA was indispensable, and the 
suit was dismissed. Price-Orem now ap-
peals from the dismissal. 
[1,2] The first issue Price-Orem raises 
is the propriety of the trial court's grant of 
Rollins, Brown's motion for a new trial. 
Under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the trial court is accorded broad 
latitude in granting a new trial. Uptown 
Appliance & Radio Co. v Flint, 122 Utah 
298, 302-03, 249 P.2d 826, 828 (1952) (cita-
tions omitted); accord Goddard v. Hick-
man, Utah, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (1984); Nel-
son v. Trujillo, Utah, 657 P.2d 730, 731-32 
(1982); King v. Union Pacific Railway, 
117 Utah 40, 46, 212 P.2d 692, 695 (1949). 
The court, however, is not free to grant a 
sented that the primary dispute in the case relat-
ed to damages, although Rollins, Brown did not 
explicitly state that it admitted liability. What-
ever the state of the pleadings as to Rollins, 
Brown's concessions of liability, at trial it 
presented evidence controverting liability, 
which came in without objection. 
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new trial merely because it disagrees with 
the judgment of the jury A new trial may 
properly be granted only when the jury's 
verdict is "manifestly against the weight of 
the evidence " Goddard v Hickman, 685 
P.2d at 532 And the decision of the trial 
court to grant a new trial will not be dis-
turbed on appeal when the record contains 
"substantial competent evidence which 
would support a verdict [in favor of the 
moving party]" King v Union Pacific 
Railway, 117 Utah at 53, 212 P 2d at 698, 
accord, e g, Nelson v Trujillo, 657 P 2d at 
732, Goddard v Hickman, 685 P2d at 
532 This substantial evidence standard 
requires that the evidence 
be sufficient in amount and credibility 
that, when considered in connection with 
the other evidence and circumstances 
shown m the case, [it] would justify 
some, but not necessarily a)), reasonable 
minds acting fairly thereon, to believe it 
to be the truth 
Utah State Road Commission v Steele 
Ranch, Utah, 533 P 2d 888, 890 (1975), ac-
cord Seybold v Union Pacific Railway, 
121 Utah 61, 65-66, 239 P2d 174, 177 
(1951), Ranch Homes, Inc v Greater 
Park City Corp, Utah, 592 P 2d 620, 626 
(1979) To establish that the trial court 
erroneously granted a new trial m this 
case, Pnce-Orem must marshal the evi-
dence supporting Rollins, Brown's case and 
demonstrate that such evidence is not suffi-
ciently substantial or credible to support a 
verdict in favor of Rollins, Brown Cf 
Scharfv BMG Corp, Utah, 700 P 2d 1068, 
1070 (1985) 
We first consider whether substantial ev-
idence would have supported a verdict in 
Rollins, Brown's favor on the liability issue 
The only evidence that Pnce-Orem intro-
duced relating to Rollins, Brown's negli-
gence was the testimony of Pnce-Orem's 
president, an engineer, who stated that "no 
reasonable surveyor" would have staked a 
building site without consulting the ongi-
nal survey, and the testimony of Rollins, 
Brown's engineer that the erroneously lo-
cated stake had been placed by one of 
Rollins Brown's employees Pnce-Orem 
otherwise relied entirely upon the fact of 
the error, coupled with Rollins, Brown's 
purported confessions of error in vanous 
pleadings, to establish liability 
Rollins, Brown argues before this Court 
that while a staking error occurred, the 
error did not constitute negligence Rol-
lins, Brown asserts that its obligations to 
stake the building site were independent of 
its obligations under the initial survey and 
that its staking of the Skaggs building 
from the designated corner without refer-
ence to the initial survey was acceptable 
withm the engineering and surveying pro-
fessions 
[3] There was evidence that could have 
supported a jury verdict for Rollins, 
Brown Contrary to Price-Orem's conten-
tions, the pleadings, taken in the context of 
the entire proceeding, were ambiguous on 
the 2ssue of liability Rollins, Brown's an-
swer, while denying negligence and alter-
natively admitting the fact of error, denied 
that Pnce-Orem was damaged And al-
though Rollins, Brown's trial memorandum 
conceded liability, at the tnal itself testimo-
ny was introduced without objection to 
show that the surveying and staking were 
proper and m conformity with professional 
standards The record contains contradic-
tions, but it appears that substantial evi-
dence existed to justify the verdict m favor 
of Rollins, Brown Under such circum-
stances, we must sustain the trial court's 
ultimate decision to grant a new tnal 
King v Union Pacific Railway, 117 Utah 
at 53, 212 P 2d at 698 
Because the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in granting a new tnal on the 
liability issue, we need not discuss whether 
the court erred m holding the award of 
damages excessive However, because the 
issue will be faced again on retrial, we 
must address whether Rollins, Brown was 
entitled to introduce evidence of Pnce-
Orem's alleged failure to mitigate dam-
ages 
[4] In its answer to Pnce-Orem's com-
plaint, Rollins, Brown did not plead failure 
to mitigate damages as an affirmative de-
fense Pnce-Orem * argues that under 
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Pratt v. Board of Education, Utah, 564 
P.2d 294, 298 (1977), affd on rehearing, 
569 P.2d 1112 (1977), such a defense must 
be pleaded or it is waived. Price-Orem 
misconstrues Pratt and the requirements 
of Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. In Pratt, this Court upheld the 
trial court's ruling that damages were not 
at issue where a defendant not only omit-
ted to plead failure to mitigate in its an-
swer, but also failed to introduce any evi-
dence at trial to establish the plaintiffs 
failure to mitigate. 564 P.2d at 298-99. 
The case did not hold that failure to plead 
mitigation resulted in an automatic waiver 
of the defense, although it did note that 
raising such a defense in the pleadings is a 
plainly better practice. Id., citing 5 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 1273, at 322-23 (1969). The 
holding of Pratt reflects the purpose of 
Rule 8(c), which is to insure that parties 
have adequate notice of the issues and 
facts in the case. See Cheney v. Rucker, 
14 Utah 2d 205, 211, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963). 
In this case, there is no suggestion that 
Price-Orem did not have adequate notice of 
the issues. The record reflects no claim of 
surprise or prejudice, and both the plead-
ings and the parties' opening statements at 
trial show that Price-Orem was clearly 
aware that the issue of damages was the 
central one. Under these circumstances, 
Rollins, Brown was not precluded from in-
troducing evidence of Price-Orem's failure 
to mitigate. 
Having found no error in the grant of a 
new trial, we next consider the correctness 
of the trial court's dismissal of the action 
based on its determination that JPA was an 
indispensable party. That ruling was 
based upon Rollins, Brown's assertion that 
its obligations ran only to JPA, with which 
2. In Jardine and Christenson, we stated that the 
tort of negligent misrepresentation is proven 
when the above-stated elements are found and 
the other elements of fraud are present. This 
suggestion that all of the elements of fraud must 
also be proven is dictum. Although the cause of 
action for negligent misrepresentation grew out 
of common law fraud, the elements of fraud 
need not be independently established. No 
such requirement is found in the definition of 
it contracted, and that because Price-Orem 
was not in privity of contact with Rollins, 
Brown, it has no standing to bring this 
action. 
[5,6] Rollins, Brown fundamentally 
misconceives the nature of this case. 
Price-Orem's action alleges the tort of neg-
ligent misrepresentation and is neither de-
rived from nor dependent upon its having 
rights under the contract between JPA and 
Rollins, Brown. Utah long ago acknowl-
edged the tort of negligent misrepresenta-
tion, which provides that a party injured by 
reasonable reliance upon a second party's 
careless or negligent misrepresentation of 
a material fact may recover damages re-
sulting from that injury when the second 
party had a pecuniary interest in the trans-
action, was in a superior position to know 
the material facts, and should have reason-
ably foreseen that the injured party was 
likely to rely upon the fact. Jardine v. 
Brunswick, 18 Utah 2d 378, 381, 423 P.2d 
659, 661-62 (1967); Christenson v. Com-
monwealth Land Title Insurance Co., 
Utah, 666 P.2d 302, 305 (1983);2 see gener-
ally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 
(1965). Privity of contract is not a neces-
sary prerequisite to liability. Christenson 
v. Commonwealth Land Title Insurance 
Co., 666 P.2d at 307. 
[7] Clearly, Price-Orem has stated a 
cause of action for negligent misrepresen-
tation. 666 P.2d at 305. Rollins, Brown, 
an engineering firm, was hired by JPA to 
survey and stake the property and the 
building site and was bound to do so with 
that degree of care and skill expected of 
licensed surveyors and/or engineers. Giv-
en the professional expertise of Rollins, 
Brown in the surveying field, both JPA and 
Price-Orem were entitled to reasonably rely 
negligent misrepresentation in the Restatement 
or the other authorities cited in the earlier Utah 
cases. See, e.g., Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah 2d 279, 
282-83, 373 ?2d 382, 384-85 (1962). Indeed, by 
its very terms, negligent misrepresentation does 
not require the intentional mental state neces-
sary to establish fraud. We expressly disavow 
any dictum in Jardine and Christenson suggest-
ing that the tort is dependent on proof of fraud. 
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upon the information provided by Rollins, 
Brown. And Price-Orem, as the owner of 
the property for whose benefit the shop-
ping center was being constructed, was 
clearly a party whose justifiable reliance 
upon the accuracy of the survey might be 
reasonably foreseen. Other states consid-
ering this issue have held that a surveyor 
may be liable for damages incurred by a 
party who reasonably and foreseeably re-
lies upon the surveyor's professional com-
petence when the survey is negligently per-
formed. See Rozny v. Marnul, 43 I11.2d 
54, 250 N.E.2d 656, 660-63 (1969); accord 
Kent v. Bartlett, 49 Cal.App.3d 724, 729-
31, 122 Cal.Rptr. 615, 617-19 (1975). 
[8] The corollary question is whether 
JPA is nonetheless an indispensable party 
despite Price-Orem's independent standing 
to bring this action. Under Rule 19 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an indis-
pensable party is a party whose absence 
precludes the court from satisfactorily re-
solving the matter of whose rights would 
be adversely affected unless that party is 
joined. Rollins, Brown argues that the 
court cannot adequately resolve this litiga-
tion without JPA's presence because Rol-
lins, Brown might otherwise be subjected 
to multiple lawsuits. This argument is 
without merit. Under the applicable stat-
ute of limitations, JPA was precluded from 
filing any action against Rollins, Brown 
long before the court ruled that JPA was 
an indispensable party. U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 78-12-25 (1977 ed.). Rollins, Brown is 
not now exposed to multiple liability. 
Rollins, Brown also asserts that JPA is 
indispensable because JPA was jointly or 
solely responsible for the staking error. 
Given that allegation, Rollins, Brown 
should have filed a third-party complaint 
against JPA. Unfortunately for -Rollins, 
Brown, the same statute of limitations, sec-
tion 78-12-25 of the Code, also precludes it 
from filing an action against JPA. Having 
failed to adequately pursue its remedies, 
Rollins, Brown cannot now complain that 
its own failure to file a third-party com-
plaint against JPA requires a dismissal of 
the case. 
The trial court's ruling that JPA was an 
indispensable party was plain error. Ac-
cordingly, the order dismissing plaintiffs 
claim is reversed, and the case is remanded 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
HALL, CJ„ and HOWE and DURHAM, 
JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J. dissents. 
The STATE of Utah, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Jerry L. MARTIN, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 20490. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 13, 1986. 
Defendant was convicted before the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay 
E. Banks, J., of unlawful distribution for 
value of a controlled substance, and he 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., 
held that: (1) repeated telephone requests 
of an acquaintance of defendant for assist-
ance in purchasing cocaine and promises of 
a large profit were insufficient to consti-
tute illegal inducement where undercover 
narcotics officer was unaware of defend-
ant's identity, and (2) evidence would not 
warrant finding that acquaintance was di-
rected by or acting in cooperation with 
undercover police officer in relation to de-
fendant that would warrant finding of en-
trapment; officer merely gave acquain-
tance information he was to use in setting 
up sale with whomever acquaintance found 
to supply the drugs. 
Affirmed. 
